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The EU as a community of values
There are many reasons why the European Union and its Member States can be proud of what they have
achieved in terms of fundamental rights protection. It is almost 70 years since Europe left behind one of its
darkest chapters and started to build an ever closer community based on shared values, including the rule of law.
Over the years, this has developed into an impressive fundamental rights landscape in the EU. However, the
socio-economic crisis has put these fundamental rights to the test, and recent years have shown that EU
Member States are not immune to regression in terms of rule of law standards. Moreover, the new annual report
by the Fundamental Rights Agency demonstrates clearly that all Member States and indeed the EU itself are
facing major challenges, from migrants drowning off the EU’s coast, through unprecedented levels of mass
surveillance, to murders motivated by racism or extremism, as well as childhood poverty, Roma deprivation and
many other problems that risk undermining the EU’s commitments to shared values.
In this sense, respect for the shared values listed in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union cannot be
taken for granted. This gives rise to a dilemma, since the European Union is founded both politically and legally
on the assumption that all EU Member States will continue to comply with the core values they share with each
other as well as with the European Union. The years 2012 and 2013 witnessed a lively debate on how to
guarantee that all EU Member States remain within the boundaries of the so-called ‘Verfassungsbogen’ or ’arco
costituzionale’, which draws the line between what is still acceptable from a constitutional perspective in a
shared community of values – and what is not.
The question is not limited to the European Union. On the contrary, the question of how to guarantee the
intactness of the constitutional order is intrinsic to every constitutional system. The well-known but rather
pessimistic answer given by Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde was that the “libertarian secularized state lives by
prerequisites which it cannot guarantee itself. This is the great adventure it risked for freedom’s sake.”
How does this Böckenförde dilemma relate to the European Union? There is one positive and one more negative
reply to this. To start with the negative: considering the fact that the Member States build a core layer of
legitimacy where the democratic will of the participating states resides and where the EU norms are implemented
by national institutions and procedures, it has to be assumed that the EU is even less able to guarantee the
value foundation than individual Member States are. The more positive reading is that the European Union forms
an additional layer of governance that makes it possible to exercise value control in a complementary and
innovative manner. A manner that is not unidirectional, sanction-oriented and hierarchical, but rather aimed at
increasing mutual trust, based on dialogue, peer-evaluation and a culture of transnational constitutional
exchange. Admittedly, there are limits to this approach, but there is no realistic alternative to the attempt to
protect shared values together (the concept of ‘protecting’ shared values against one other would not appear
sustainable in the long run).
Recent events and potential for development
In March 2014, the European Commission presented a new EU framework to strengthen the rule of law. The
framework is “not designed to be triggered by individual breaches of fundamental rights or by a miscarriage of
justice”. Instead, it will be activated in “situations where the authorities of a Member State are taking measures or
are tolerating situations which are likely to systematically and adversely affect the integrity, stability or the proper
functioning of the institutions and the safeguard mechanisms established at national level to secure the rule
of law.” The Commission envisages a three-stage process for the mechanism whereby it could issue a public
“rule of law opinion”, a “rule of law recommendation” and, thirdly, activate one of the procedures laid down in
Article 7 of the TEU if this was deemed necessary.
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Critics of the framework have said that it “is difficult to see what the Communication adds,” complaining that “no
new sanctions are envisaged, and the hurdles for Article 7 ultimately remain as high as before”. This, however,
misses the point that the sanctioning procedure laid down in Article 7 TEU cannot be changed without Treaty
amendments. There is an obvious value in the European Commission consolidating the experiences it made in
the ‘Hungarian case’ and clarifying how it will, in the future, proceed in situations where an EU Member State
runs the risk of violating Article 2 values. The Commission’s communication also complements other new
initiatives such as its first corruption report, presented in early 2014, and its efforts to assist the EU and Member
States to “achieve more effective justice by providing objective, reliable and comparable data on the functioning
of the justice systems of all Member States” through its annual “Justice Scoreboard”.
While appreciating the benefits of this newly proposed rule of law framework, one should not stop at the
Commission’s communication, but rather recognise that there is indeed scope to move forward without having to
touch the Treaties. We would like to mention three points that we believe are vital for this debate.
Firstly, the Article 2 values should be looked at in their entirety; focusing only on the rule of law might be a too
limitative view on the community of values that is formed by the EU and its Member States. Secondly, it is
misleading to only address individual Member States and ignore the EU’s own performance in terms of value
conformity. Thirdly, any ‘EU framework’ should be as inclusive as possible and recognise the multilevel and multi-
stakeholder character of the European Union. It is of the utmost importance to include the European Parliament,
the Council of the European Union and other relevant EU bodies, as well as relevant actors at national level,
such as national parliaments, bodies with a human rights remit and civil society. It is difficult to think of any
efficient framework without buy in by all relevant actors, far beyond the usual ‘Brussels machinery’.
The way forward: a strategic framework for the protection and promotion of
fundamental rights within the EU
Fifteen years ago, a group of distinguished academics called for a human rights policy for the European Union.
At the time, this was motivated by the lack of coherence between internal and external policies, of systematic
and reliable information bases, of coordinated knowledge, resources and of many of the EU’s (then: Community)
activities, of a ‘human rights culture’ in the EU ‘apparatus’, of the mainstreaming of fundamental rights, of
consultation of relevant civil society actors, etc. Although a great deal has been achieved in these areas since
then, a strategic framework would still have a number of advantages.
We believe that it would be unfortunate to think of an EU strategic framework as an exclusively EU owned
supranational intervention. Such a framework should rather be approached as a multilevel and multi-actor
setting that could help coordinate EU and Member State efforts to protect and promote fundamental rights. It is
in this spirit that FRA has made the proposals contained in “An EU internal strategic framework for fundamental
rights: joining forces to achieve better results”, which also presents 20 different tools that could form part of such
a framework.
At the level of the EU, a strategic framework could for instance provide for an audit that would examine how the
EU legislator could better conform to the different mainstreaming obligations laid down in the EU Treaties.
Equally, such an audit could analyse whether the current mechanisms designed to make sure that EU policies do
not infringe the rights enshrined in the Charter meet expectations. Moreover, such a general assessment could
be used to consider how existing EU competencies could be better utilised to promote fundamental rights and
implement standards agreed upon in the context of the Council of Europe.
At national level, Member States could consider the adoption of national action plans (NAPs), which have proved
to be “useful tools for clarifying the authorities’ responsibilities and for identifying and addressing gaps in human
rights protection”. FRA research such as the EU-MIDIS survey suggests that EU Member States should also
target their awareness-raising efforts better, as even where EU legislation explicitly stipulates that countries
should inform citizens of their rights, as is the case in the equality directives, levels of rights awareness remain
strikingly low. Building on the example of FRA’s positive experience with its fundamental rights platform (FRP),
individual countries could consider establishing national fundamental rights platforms that bring together
government institutions and civil society to take part in a structured dialogue.
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At transnational level, a strategic framework could provide for enhanced cooperation, exchange of promising
practices, and peer evaluation mechanisms. In addition, a strategic framework should also put sufficient
emphasis on the local level. The Charter for multilevel governance in Europe, which was recently adopted by the
Committee of the Regions, rightly affirms the importance of local partnerships and the exchange of promising
practices (see in this regard FRA’s joined-up e-toolkit for local, regional and national public officials). Increased
levels of cooperation and coordination are particularly important in countries with a federal structure, in which
the implementation of fundamental rights falls under the competence of a number of authorities at various levels.
Examples like these show that a strategic framework would have to be filled with life over time, to ensure that it
incorporates all relevant actors and does not end up in becoming a Brussels-driven box-ticking exercise.
However, the EU institutions can nonetheless provide highly relevant advice. For instance, the institutions can
supply guidelines on fundamental rights implementation related to relevant EU legislation. The Commission did
this in the areas of victims’ rights and family reunification, as did FRA in the context of apprehending irregular
migrants or the processing of Passenger Names Records. The EU institutions could also assist in the exchange
of promising practices and the provision of expert know-how wherever applicable.
At a more political level, the strategic framework would envisage a fundamental rights policy cycle, enabling
relevant actors to come together in a structured dialogue over course of the year. Such a cycle would help both
to guarantee that national experiences feed into EU-level policy developments, and that EU-level developments
are implemented on the ground. It would further allow better coordination of fundamental rights-relevant policies
approved by the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission,
rendering their respective roles and activities more efficient. A variety of formats for such a policy cycle could be
considered, such as an annual fundamental rights forum that brings together relevant EU actors with civil
society; an inter-institutional exchange on fundamental rights between European Parliament, Council and
European Commission, or an action plan for the protection and promotion of fundamental rights within the EU.
Conclusion
Just like its Member States, the EU itself suffers from a Böckenförde-dilemma. Moreover, from a more legal
perspective, the EU’s means to intervene in areas outside its legislative competence remain limited. However,
the EU does offer a vital additional layer of governance that allows all Member States to exchange experiences
and increase their willingness to accept constructive criticism as an expression of a shared fundamental rights
culture. Fundamental rights are central to the value debate, as the Charter of Fundamental Rights can be read as
an operational version of the Article 2 values. Taking fundamental rights seriously is thus an excellent way of
guaranteeing coherence within the EU’s community of values. Protecting and promoting fundamental rights is a
means of working proactively to prevent rule of law crises. Moreover, a decline in regard for fundamental rights
can indicate systemic deficiencies in the rule of law.
The Council of the European Union recently tabled the idea of a ‘Union internal strategy on fundamental rights’ .
This is a promising and exciting step. Now it is crucial to gain support at all layers of governance. Due to the
limited legislative competencies of the Union and its specific nature as a mixtum compositum, it would be greatly
beneficial if the EU Member States could complement the fundamental rights strategy with something akin to a
peer-review process on the Article 2 values. Let’s start thinking creatively about how we can not only uphold the
shared values in the EU, but also develop them. Not in order to reject diversity, but in order to create trust in our
unifying community of values.
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